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Email security

Exchange Online Mailbox Audit: Forwarding, Rules and Delegated Access

Audit Exchange Online forwarding, inbox rules and delegated permissions with a read-only example, evidence worksheet and practical remediation checks.

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What an Exchange Online mailbox security audit should establish

An Exchange Online mailbox security audit should establish who can read or send from important mailboxes, where messages can be forwarded, which rules affect delivery, and whether those arrangements are approved and monitored. Reviewing spam protection alone does not answer these questions. A legitimate account with excessive delegated access, or an old forwarding arrangement that nobody owns, can create exposure without changing the organisation’s email filtering settings.

This guide describes an evidence-led review of mailbox forwarding, inbox rules and delegated permissions. It is intended for Microsoft 365 administrators, security teams and people commissioning an email security assessment. It provides an original collection worksheet, example read-only inspection and acceptance tests. Examples are illustrative; they do not describe a completed customer engagement or imply that an unfamiliar setting is necessarily malicious.

Use it as a focused workstream within a Microsoft 365 security audit. Identity protection, application permissions, email authentication, device security and retention need their own review. A mailbox assessment should name those dependencies and pass unresolved questions to the appropriate owner rather than presenting a forwarding inventory as complete assurance over Microsoft 365.

Start with business-sensitive mailboxes and a defensible sample

Build the review population from the business processes that depend on email. Finance, executive support, procurement, human resources, legal correspondence and customer service may warrant different priorities. Identify shared mailboxes and operational addresses as well as named users. A shared finance inbox may contain more sensitive payment instructions than a typical employee mailbox, even though nobody signs into it as part of the approved workflow.

Record the population size, selection criteria and exclusions. A sample can be appropriate for an initial assessment, but the report must distinguish a complete forwarding inventory from a sampled review of rule intent or delegated access. If only ten mailboxes were examined, do not describe the result as proof that the entire tenant has no unwanted forwarding. Explain which exports were complete and which decisions relied on interviews or spot checks.

Assign a business owner to each high-priority mailbox. The technical administrator can explain how a setting works, but may not know whether an external service still needs the information or whether a delegate has changed roles. Agree how ownership questions will be resolved before collection begins. Otherwise the assessment produces a long list of settings with no reliable way to distinguish necessary access from abandoned access.

PopulationQuestions to prioritise
Finance and procurementWho can read supplier correspondence, issue messages or redirect invoice-related mail?
Executive and assistant mailboxesAre reading and sending rights separately justified and reviewed?
Shared operational mailboxesWho owns membership, forwarding destinations and leaver removal?
Recently changed rolesDid access follow the person after the business need ended?
External-service integrationsWhat data leaves the tenant, under whose approval, and through which mechanism?

Agree collection access and protect the evidence

Prefer a documented collection plan with the tenant owner running approved commands where practical. The assessment should not begin by requesting unrestricted administrator access merely because that is convenient. Specify the commands, mailbox population, properties and collection period needed. Confirm that the assigned role actually supports the operation; read-oriented role names do not guarantee that every Exchange inspection command is available.

For example, Microsoft’s Get-InboxRule reference notes permission restrictions, including that Global Reader and View-Only Organization Management do not provide this command’s access in Exchange Online. Resolve the collection method with the administrator rather than broadening privileges without review. A supervised export may be preferable to handing the assessor an unnecessarily powerful account.

Rule definitions and permission exports can themselves be sensitive. They may reveal personal addresses, supplier names, confidential project folders or the structure of internal operations. Store them in an agreed restricted location, record who collected them and keep a redacted working copy for reporting. Do not paste raw exports into public tickets or consumer file-sharing services. Agree retention and deletion with the owner as part of the engagement.

Secure correspondence tray with envelopes and identity credentials
Scope collection around business-sensitive mailboxes and approved evidence access. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Separate the mechanisms instead of searching for one setting

Treat mailbox forwarding, inbox rules, delegated rights and organisation-level mail routing as separate collection categories. They answer different questions. An address visible in one view does not prove that every route has been examined, and the absence of mailbox-level forwarding does not prove that no rule can redirect a message. Build a worksheet that names each category and its collection status.

Microsoft’s mailbox forwarding guidance distinguishes a configured forwarding destination and the option to retain delivery in the original mailbox. Capture both. From an assessment perspective, it matters whether the arrangement is intended as a copy, a migration handoff or an operational routing dependency. The same destination can have very different consequences depending on that purpose.

Include relevant transport rules and external-mail policies in the agreed review, or explicitly mark them outside scope. Also identify application-based access as a separate dependency. Removing an inbox rule is not a complete assessment of every application that may read email. The report should make these boundaries visible without claiming that one collection tool enumerates all possible message access.

MechanismReview questionEvidence category
Mailbox forwardingIs the destination and delivery behaviour approved?Mailbox configuration and owner decision
Inbox rulesWhich conditions trigger forwarding, redirection, movement or deletion?Rule properties, priority and enabled state
DelegationWho can read, send as, or send on behalf?Permission entries and resolved principals
Organisation routingCan a broader routing arrangement affect the mailbox?Relevant mail-flow rule and policy scope
Application accessCan an application access messages independently?Separate application-permission review

Audit forwarding as a data-flow decision

For each forwarding destination, identify whether it is internal or external, who controls it and why it exists. Resolve references to recipient objects rather than assuming that a familiar display name identifies an internal endpoint. Ask whether the destination remains under the organisation’s control and whether the business owner expects the relevant categories of messages to leave the original mailbox.

Document the approval trail and review date. An arrangement created during a merger or service migration may once have been reasonable but no longer have an owner. That does not prove malicious activity; it does justify a clear decision. Retain, restrict, replace or remove it through an approved change. If the purpose cannot be established, report the uncertainty and the potentially affected data rather than inventing a business justification.

Do not test a destination controlled by an unknown party by sending sensitive mail to it. If an end-to-end check is needed, use an authorised destination controlled by the organisation and a clearly synthetic message. Record exactly which route was tested and whether the observation applies to the original configuration. Where safe verification is unavailable, distinguish configured forwarding from observed delivery.

Internal mail enclosure linked to an external destination through a controlled channel
A forwarding destination is a data-flow decision with an owner and a reason. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Inspect rule behaviour, not just the rule name

A rule named “Invoices” may perform ordinary filing, while a meaningless name may belong to a harmless automation. Names help navigation but are not a reliable security classification. Review the conditions, actions, exceptions, enabled state and order. Ask what messages match and what happens to them. Pay particular attention to combinations that affect sensitive correspondence or make important messages less visible to their intended recipient.

Collect rule properties before changing anything. If a rule appears connected to an active compromise, preserve the relevant evidence and move into the organisation’s incident-response process. An audit is not permission to silently delete suspicious objects. Premature cleanup can disrupt operations and make later investigation harder. The owner must decide containment through the appropriate response authority, with the assessor explaining the evidence and uncertainty.

The following example is a read-only inspection for a single approved mailbox in an already authenticated Exchange Online PowerShell session. Replace the example identity with a mailbox in the agreed scope. It includes hidden rules where supported and selects properties useful for review; it is not a complete mail-flow or compromise detector. Check current cmdlet support and permissions before running it.

Get-InboxRule -Mailbox 'audit-test@example.com' -IncludeHidden |
  Select-Object Identity, Name, Enabled, Priority,
    ForwardTo, RedirectTo, ForwardAsAttachmentTo,
    DeleteMessage, MoveToFolder, StopProcessingRules, Description

Review the output with the mailbox owner or their authorised representative. A long rule description may contain important conditions that a short summary hides. Preserve the source representation alongside your worksheet. If collection returns an error or an incomplete result, record it as a coverage limitation rather than treating an empty table as evidence that no rules exist.

Envelopes being sorted through layered partitions with one diverted path
Follow the rule conditions through to their actions and exceptions. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Review reading and sending rights separately

Microsoft distinguishes Full Access, Send As and Send on behalf. Full Access permits mailbox access but does not itself grant sending rights. Send As permits sending as the mailbox but does not itself grant reading rights. Do not combine them into one vague “delegate” column: the business owner must understand which capability is being approved.

Resolve every principal to a person, group or other relevant object, and record the source of the permission. Where a group grants access, review the membership and the process for changing it. A permission entry that looks appropriate can still expose a mailbox to an overbroad group. Conversely, an individual entry may be justified by a specific assistant or service role. Base the finding on the actual access need and evidence.

Ask whether the access remains necessary after role changes, leave periods, supplier transitions and employee departures. Check who owns periodic review and how revocation is verified. A manager’s verbal statement that access “should have been removed” is a lead for verification, not proof that it was. Preserve the relevant permission state and the owner’s decision in the remediation record.

CapabilityBusiness approval should explain
Read and manage mailbox contentsWhich role needs access, for which process, and for how long
Send as the mailboxWhich communications the delegate may issue under that identity
Send on behalfWhy this representation is appropriate and who is accountable
Group-based accessWho controls membership and how the effective population is reviewed
Temporary accessExpiry decision, removal owner and evidence that removal occurred
Separate identity keys beside a correspondence cabinet
Reading a mailbox and sending under its identity are separate privileges. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Compare configured routes with the external-forwarding policy

A forwarding object and the policy that permits or blocks delivery are separate pieces of evidence. Review the policy applicable to the mailbox rather than assuming the tenant’s default setting applies everywhere. Record any scoped exceptions and the business reason for them. A blocked route may still be an unwanted configuration worth cleaning up, but it should not be reported as confirmed external delivery without supporting evidence.

Microsoft’s automatic external forwarding guidance describes the policy controls and cautions that the system-controlled setting can differ by organisation history. Use explicit policy evidence and approved validation instead of relying on a setting’s label. Record the policy state at the assessment time; a historical event may have occurred under a different configuration.

For a required forwarding exception, ask why the existing business process needs automatic external delivery and whether a more controlled workflow is feasible. Do not promise that a universal block is operationally safe. Ticketing platforms, migrations or approved service arrangements may depend on routing. The assessment should expose these dependencies so the owner can choose a controlled correction, not surprise the business with an unplanned outage.

Use a worksheet that supports an actual decision

A useful worksheet joins technical settings to ownership and disposition. Give each record a stable identifier so it can be referenced in the report and change ticket. Record the collection source, time and relevant mailbox identifier. Keep personal addresses restricted where they are not necessary for the audience. The executive summary can refer to a category of exposure while the technical owner retains the full details.

FieldPurpose
Mailbox and business ownerEstablish responsibility and business sensitivity
Mechanism and object referenceIdentify the exact setting, rule or permission
Effective destination or principalExplain where information goes or who receives access
Business purpose and approvalSeparate necessary operation from unexplained configuration
Observed behaviourDistinguish configuration review from an authorised delivery or access check
Risk and confidenceExplain consequence and strength of supporting evidence separately
Decision and ownerRetain, narrow, replace, remove or investigate
Closure evidenceState the repeatable check that demonstrates completion

Use explicit values such as “not collected,” “owner confirmation pending” and “not safely tested.” Blank cells are ambiguous and often turn into unjustified confidence later. A worksheet that preserves uncertainty makes the report more useful: it shows exactly which next action will resolve the question and who must supply the missing information.

Validate with synthetic mail and designated identities

Where behaviour needs validation, agree the recipient, sender, message content, expected route and test window in advance. Use a unique non-sensitive marker so the test can be identified without copying real correspondence. Confirm that every destination is authorised and controlled for the test. A mailbox owner’s permission does not automatically authorise sending material to an unrelated external address.

For delegated access, use a designated test arrangement that represents the permission under review without exposing production correspondence. Validate the relevant capability separately: reading a synthetic item is different from sending an agreed test message. Record client context and any prerequisite configuration. If the review only confirms permission entries, label it as configuration evidence rather than implying that each delegate’s access was exercised.

Include negative cases when practical. A designated identity without the approved right should not perform the same operation. After a corrective change, repeat the previously permitted unwanted action and confirm the legitimate workflow still works. Document the tested boundaries and avoid extrapolating a single successful check into a statement about every client, mailbox or route.

Know when an audit observation becomes an incident question

Unexplained forwarding, unusual rules or unexpected delegation can warrant investigation, but none alone establishes who created it or whether data was taken. Preserve the evidence and compare it with authorised change records. Ask the response owner to determine whether the situation requires containment and broader investigation. Keep the audit finding factual while that decision is made.

Build a timeline from available evidence rather than reconstructing events from memory. Record the discovery time, collection time, relevant configuration and any attributable change events available within retention. Distinguish the time an object was observed from the time it was created or used. If historical records are unavailable, say so. A current configuration snapshot cannot establish how long a route existed or how many messages traversed it.

Do not search personal mailbox contents indiscriminately just because an anomaly was found. Agree the investigation scope, authority and data-handling arrangements with the organisation. The immediate technical question may be answerable through configuration and event evidence; content examination, legal review or notification decisions can require different owners. This separation protects both the investigation’s usefulness and the people whose correspondence is involved.

Clock and correspondence evidence arranged for timeline review
Separate observed configuration, attributed changes and confirmed message delivery. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Example finding: a legacy finance forwarding exception

Consider a fictional finance mailbox with a forwarding destination associated with a previous service arrangement. The business owner cannot identify a current need, and the policy review shows an exception that could permit the relevant automatic forwarding. At this stage the supported conclusion is an unowned configured route with potentially sensitive consequences. It is not yet proof that a malicious actor read invoices or that every message was delivered externally.

The assessment records the mailbox setting, policy scope, destination ownership evidence and missing approval. The owner then authorises a safe validation or decides that the uncertainty is sufficient to remove the arrangement through change control. The recommendation includes checking the replacement business workflow, preserving relevant evidence and reviewing related exceptions. Severity reflects the information handled and the plausible consequence, while confidence reflects what was actually verified.

Closure requires more than a screenshot of a completed ticket. The reviewer collects the changed configuration, confirms the old exception is no longer effective where intended and validates that required finance correspondence still reaches the approved recipients. If an incident review is also opened, its outcome remains distinct from the audit closure. This produces a clear record without inflating a configuration issue into an invented breach narrative.

Close the route and the process that allowed it

Prioritise corrections by consequence, exposure and certainty. An unexplained external route on a sensitive mailbox may need urgent owner attention, while an overbroad internal convenience permission may require a planned role review. Neither should be handled by automatically deleting every unfamiliar entry. Assign a named technical owner and business approver, and identify any dependencies before implementation.

Fix the lifecycle weakness as well as the immediate object. If an exception survived a supplier change, add that review to the supplier offboarding process. If delegates retained access after moving teams, improve the access-change workflow and its evidence. If nobody owned the shared mailbox, establish ownership before the next review cycle. Otherwise the same problem returns under a different name.

Use a closure checklist with the original object reference, approved change, post-change evidence, legitimate workflow check and residual questions. Keep accepted risks separate from fixed findings. An owner can choose to retain a necessary exception, but that decision should document the reason, controls and next review. A risk acceptance is not a technical remediation, and reporting should preserve that distinction.

Reviewed folder and controlled correspondence path beside a secure cabinet
Verify the correction and repair the ownership process behind it. Conceptual illustration, not a customer mailbox or investigation result.

Specify useful deliverables when commissioning the review

Request a coverage statement, forwarding and delegation inventory, sampled rule review, evidence-backed findings and an owner-ready action list. Ask how the provider will collect data, handle sensitive exports and distinguish approved arrangements from unexplained ones. Confirm whether transport rules, application permissions and historical audit evidence are included or treated as separate workstreams.

A strong report should let your administrator trace a finding to a specific object and collection time, understand its business consequence and perform a defined closure check. It should not merely reproduce a large export or recommend disabling all delegation. Delegation and controlled routing support legitimate work; the objective is deliberate, reviewable access that matches the organisation’s needs.

Bring a summary of mailbox types, sensitive business processes, known external forwarding needs and recent organisational changes to the initial discussion. Do not send mailbox passwords, message archives or raw permission exports through a public form. Use the Microsoft 365 audit planner to describe the workstream, or contact Atlant Security to agree a focused Exchange Online mailbox review and secure evidence exchange.

Reviewed 25 October 2026. Product behaviour, administrative interfaces and permissions can change. Verify current Microsoft documentation and the organisation’s actual tenant configuration before collecting evidence or changing controls. This guide is a practical assessment method, not a finding about your environment.

Published by Atlant Security. Sources, editorial policy and corrections.

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